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CASE NOTES
Admiralty - Cause of Action Arising in Airspace Under De ath on the
High Seas Act.-Plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of her deceased hus-
band, brought an action against the defendant, a New York corporation, for
wrongful death. The deceased, a resident of Puerto Rico, was a passenger on de-
fendant's airflight from Puerto Rico to New York and allegedly suffered shock
when the pilot "feathered" the plane's engine while it was over the high seas.
Deceased died four days later in New York. Plaintiff contended that since death
occurred in New York, and the defendant was a New York corporation, the
New York Decedent Estate Law' was applicable and not the Federal Death on
the High Seas Act.2 The action, however, was heard in admiralty under the
Death on the High Seas Act, and a decision was rendered in favor of defendant.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Federal Death on
the High Seas Act gives a right of action in admiralty for death caused by
wrongful act, neglect or default occurring in the airspace over the high seas.
D'Alernan v. Pan Am. World Airways, 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
At common law wrongful death was not considered an actionable injury
either in the civil courts3 or in admiralty.4 Today, however, a statutory right
of action for wrongful death has been granted in every state. Where the wrong-
ful act which causes death occurs on the high seas, i.e., beyond a marine'league
from the shore of any state, the right of action is given by the Federal Death on
the High Seas Act. The purpose of this statute, as of those of each state, is
to give a remedy where none existed at common law.5 Section 1 provides:
"Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or
default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of
any State ... the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit
for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty . .. ."
Prior cases have held that, where wrongful death was occasioned by the crash
of an aircraft into the sea, the Act conferred a right of action.7 In other cases s
the Act was said to apply to a plane lost at sea where the passengers were
presumed dead. In the former cases the courts were not called upon to decide
whether "on the high seas" may be construed to include the airspace over
1. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 130.
2. 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1952).
3. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (N.P. 1808). But see Holds-
worth, History of English Law 331-36 (3d ed. 1927).
4. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). See also Robinson, Admiralty 135 (1939);
Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act § 204 (2d ed. 1913).
5. 59 Cong. Rec. 4482 (1920) (remarks of Representative Volstead).
6. 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1952).
7. Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957); Higa v. Trans-
ocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1956); Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp.
84 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
8. Choy v. Pan Am. Airways, 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Wyman v.
Pan Am. Airways, 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1944).
Both cases arose out of the same accident.
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the high seas. The instant case is the first to give a right of action under
the Act where there was no possible contact with the sea or inference
thereof. The court here adopted the reasoning of Choy v. Pan Am. World
Airways,9 where it was stated that the phrase "on the high seas" was
intended only as a geographical expression "capable of expansion to, under,
or over, as scientific advances change methods of travel." 10  This court,
as in the Choy case, specifically extended the purview of the statute, reason-
ing that a cause of action arising above the high seas demanded as ade-
quate a remedy as one arising in a vessel on the seas, and that the statute
was not intended by its nature to be restrictive in its application.
While it does not expressly appear that the legislature intended to apply the
Act to aircraft,"- the extension is a reasonable one. Generally, admiralty will
hear tort actions as long as the place of the wrong is on the high seas,'12 and
the test of admiralty jurisdiction is one of locality, not the nature of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the wrong.13 Further, since the purpose of the Act was
to give a remedy in an area not adequately covered by existing statutes, a
construction restricting the remedy to wrongs occurring on the surface of the
sea and denying it to wrongs occurring in the airspace above the sea would
seem an arbitrary distinction, and certainly at odds with the familiar canon
that remedial statutes should be liberally construed.
Prior to the enactment of the Death on the High Seas Act, there was, as
noted, no statute giving an action for wrongful death on the sea.' 4 Many states,
however, had wrongful death statutes which, at first, were applied to a state's
territorial waters. In the absence of conflicting federal legislation, this action
was sustained by the United States Supreme Court." Subsequently, the Su-
preme Court confirmed the power of a state to create an enforceable right of
action for death occurring beyond the state's territorial waters, i.e., on the high
seas.'6 This power, however, was a limited one because the state could impose
liability only on a vessel or person over whom it had jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
was usually predicated on one of two grounds; that a vessel on which a wrong-
ful act occurred was constructively part of the territory of the state, or that the
wrongdoer was a vessel or citizen of the state and subject to its jurisdiction even
beyond the territorial limits. These theories generated considerable confusion
and conflict.' 7 The purpose of the Federal Death on the High Seas Act was
9. 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
10. Id. at 484. (Emphasis added.)
11. 59 Cong. Rec. 4482-86 (1920).
12. 1 Benedict, Admiralty § 127 (6th ed. 1940) ; Robinson, Admiralty § 11 (1939).
13. 1 Benedict, Admiralty § 127 (6th ed. 1940). See also The Plymouth, 70 U.S.
(3 Wall) 20 (1866).
14. See note 4 supra.
15. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. (16 Wall)
522 (1872). This position was also taken by the New York Court of Appeals in Mc-
Donald v. Mallory, 77 N.Y. 546 (1879).
16. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
17. See Hughes, Death Actions in Admiralty, 31 Yale L.J. 115 (1921); Robinson,
Wrongful Death in Admiralty and the Conflict of Laws, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 406 (1936);
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to end conflicts by establishing a uniform right of action pre-empting state
jurisdiction.' Though some controversy exists, generally it is held that the
Act, when applicable, gives an exclusive right to sue in admiralty and pre-
empts any right to sue in a civil court.19
The Court of Appeals of New York has held, under circumstances where
plaintiff's testator disappeared over the high seas in defendant's aircraft, that
the New York Decedent Estate Law is inapplicable, the sole right of action
being under the Death on the High Seas Act. 20 Had the court in the instant
case refused to extend the Death on the High Seas Act to the situation here pre-
sented, the plaintiff might have been without a remedy. At least until such time
as the issue would have been resolved by the United States Supreme Court, there
would have then existed the anomalous situation of both state and federal
courts recognizing the existence of a cause of action but denying, each to itself,
authority to entertain it.2 '
The court in the instant case determined that the law governing airspace
over the high seas is the province of admiralty. Jurisdictions following this de-
cision would deny a plaintiff an action under state law when a wrongful act
resulting in death occurs over the high seas. The effect of this position is to
hold state wrongful death statutes inapplicable when the wrongful act occurs
beyond the state's territorial limits.
Magruder & Grout, Wrongful Death Within the Admiralty jurisdiction, 35 Yale L.J.
395 (1926).
18. 59 Cong. Rec. 4485 (1920) (remarks of Representative Volstead).
19. An amendment to the bill in the course of passage raised uncertainty as to whether
the act gave exclusive remedy. The original bill provided that the provisions of any state
statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected
by this Act as to causes of action accruing within the territorial limits of any state. 59
Cong. Rec. 4482 (1920) (remarks of Representative Volstead). At this point it was clear
that the Act was to be exclusive. Illinois Representative Mann, in the course of debate,
offered an amendment to strike the last phrase from the section quoted above. This
amendment passed with the bill and § 7 provides that "the provisions of any State statute
giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this
chapter." 41 Stat. 538 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1952). The prevailing judicial opinion
seems to be that the Act gives an exclusive remedy. See Noel v. Linea Aeropostal
Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957); Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780
(9th Cir. 1956); Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 84 (D.C. Cal. 1954). But
cf. Choy v. Pan Am. Airways Co., 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
20. Wyman v. Pan Am. Airways, 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1943),
aff'd, 267 App. Div. 947, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d 785,
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1944).
21. Under the Wyman case, where the court held that the New York Decedent Estate
Law was inapplicable because the cause of action did not arise within the territorial
limits of the state, a New York court, in such a situation as the instant case, could not
give a remedy for lack of jurisdiction.
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Antitrust - Defenses to Robinson-Patman Act Section 2(e).-Petitioner,
a manufacturer, furnished free displays to preferred customers while charging
others. Finding the discrimination per se violative of section 2(e) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, the Federal Trade Commission ordered the manufacturer
to cease and desist. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, one
judge dissenting, reversed. The court held that cost justification may be proved
as a defense to an alleged violation of section 2 (e), but that competitive injury
need not be shown. Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. granted, 358 U.S. 897 (1958).
In the early 1930's an investigation by the Federal Trade Commission and
the Patman Committee of the House of Representatives disclosed that large
chain stores were eliciting discriminatory concessions from their suppliers.'
This situation flourished beyond the reach of section 2 of the Clayton Act.
To strike at such practices the Robinson-Patman Act was enacted as an amend-
ment to the Clayton Act.2 Section 2(e) as amended was directed against the
discriminatory practices of furnishing services to one buyer and not to the other
buyers on proportionally equal terms.
Section 2(e) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against
another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with or without
processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the
furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale,
or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all
purchasers on proportionally equal terms.3
One of the first questions raised by the present case was whether competitive
injury is an essential ingredient to a section 2(e) violation. Representative
Wright Patman discusses in his book, The Robinson-Patman Act, the problem
of competitive injury and its application to sections 2(a), (c), (d) and (e) .4
He concluded that the phrase "to all purchasers" in section 2(e) represented
all purchasers throughout the country so long as they were on the same pur-
chasing level-jobbers, wholesalers, retailers, etc.5 Thus, a seller offering a
service to a buyer in New York must offer the same service on proportionally
equal terms to a buyer in California, regardless of whether or not such buyers
are in actual competition.
The cases are in accord with Representative Patman's view. The Supreme
Court has held that furnishing advertisements to one purchaser upon terms
not accorded to other purchasers violates section 2(e).6 In Elizabeth Arden,
1. H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936).
2. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
3. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1952).
4. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act (1938).
5. Id. at 52. This distinction dismissing the action because the discrimination was
between two purchasers on different competitive levels was followed by the court of ap-
peals in Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949).
6. Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
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Inc. v. FTC,7 the court expressly refused to carry into section 2 (e) the require-
ment of adverse effect upon competition which is found in section 2 (a), reason-
ing that Congress made a decision which was not for the court to change. The
rule was affirmed in numerous subsequent cases.
8
Some confusion as to injury stems from treble damage actions9 brought for
violation of section 2 (e). The violation of section 2 (e) iemains unchanged,
the variable being the remedy. If the Government brings the action for a cease
and desist order or to impose a penalty, competitive injury is not involved.10
While in an action by an individual for treble damages, such injury is obviously
the essence of the recovery because damages are measured by the extent of
the injury."
Although the courts have consistently held that competitive injury is not
essential in a section 2(e) violation, this view has been criticized as being in
conflict with the broader antitrust objectives.' 2 It is contended that not only
is it out of line with other antitrust legislation but that it fosters inefficient
competition. 3 These writers believe that a change is required either by legis-
lation 1 4 or through judicial interpretation.' 5 In view of the judical precedents, 16
it would appear that any change would have to come from Congress. Thus, the
ruling of the present court that competitive injury is not essential for a viola-
tion of section 2 (e) is but another illustration of stare decisis.
The court here, however) further held that the justification in the first part of
section 2(b) 17 included cost justification and made such applicable to sec-
tion 2(e). The latter position is quite questionable. Typical of services or
facilities violative of section 2(e) are the providing of a demonstrator, paying
7. 156 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1946). Accord, Corn Prod-
ucts Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
8. Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949);.
United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. v. H. Weinreich Co., 107 F. Supp. 89 (SD.N.Y. 1952);
Myers v. Shell' Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. '670 (S.D. Cal. 1951). But cf. Chicago Sugar Co. v.
American Sugar Refining Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949) (dictum).
9. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
10. Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
11. 178 F.2d at 153.
12. Att'y Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 191-92 (1955).
13. Comment, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1139, 1199 (1952).
14. Id. at 1202.
15. See note 12 supra.
16. Cases cited note 8 supra.
17. "Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that
there has been discrimination in price or services of facilities furnished, the burden of
rebutting the prima-fade case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person
charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively
shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination:
Provided, however, That nothing contained . . . [herein] shall prevent a seller rebutting
the prima-fade case thus .made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of
services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor."
49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1952).
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the salary of a saleswoman or beauty counselor, providing special containers or
labels or the furnishing of advertising and demonstrator's aids. Such services
are mutually beneficial to both buyer and seller or merely to the buyer alone. A
distinction on the basis of the parties benefited was made in State Wholesale
Grocers v. Great A. & P. Co.,I s where the seller advertised in Women's Day, a
magazine published and distributed solely by the buyer, A. & P. It was held that
section 2(e) would not be violated if the service furnished benefited the sup-
plier alone or if there were but incidental benefit to the buyer. The court
went on to state that where the benefit inures primarily to the buyer or equally
to the buyer and seller, there is a violation of section 2 (e), unless proportion-
ally equal treatment is given to all buyers on the same level. This rule has
been limited somewhat by American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 9
where the seller wished to furnish a service to its purchasers, such service being
more efficiently rendered to some purchasers than to others. The seller may
render such service as efficiently as possible to each purchaser regardless of the
difference in the ultimate cost to the seller, and such difference may be reflected
in the price to the buyer.
The use of cost justification as a defense to a section 2(e) violation has
opened the door to the problems2 0 which existed under the old section 2 of
the Clayton Act. Thus, discrimination by giving competitive preference to one
purchaser over another is possible through the use of cost justification. Hence,
in the furnishing of advertising, the seller, by proving benefit in proportion to
the money invested, would thereby have eliminated the thing to be justified.
The one furnished the advertising is also benefited while his competition is not.
This same rationale would be applicable where the cost of the service is less
when purchased by the seller, than if purchased directly by the customer.
The majority in the present case held that the cost justification defense to
section 2(e) is developed from the justification in the first clause of section
2(b). It was argued that if the first justification in section 2(b) is not given
substantive meaning, section 2 (b) would be read out of the case. The majority,
therefore, states that "cost justification under the circumstances here may
affirmatively be shown in order to dispel the charge of unlawful discrimina-
tion." 2 ' This would make each new case one of first impression in relation
to the new found defenses. The effect is to give the courts the power to en-
large or contract the defenses of section 2(b), as applied to each case. This
leaves us without a standard and adds to the already existing confusion. In
Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC,22 it was held that the first part of section 2(b)
was procedural and merely a reiteration of the common law rule of evidence.
It is left now for the Supreme Court to eliminate the defense of cost justification,
while preserving for the defendant the defense that the facilities were furnished
on proportionally equal terms.
18. 154 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
19. 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951).
20. Rowe, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective,
57 Colum. L. Rev. 1059, 1063-64 (1957).
21. 258 F.2d at 681. (Emphasis added.)
22. 346 U.S. 61, 78 (1953).
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Antitrust-Merger Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.-Bethlehem Steel
Corporation and Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, the second and sixth
largest steel producers in the nation,' executed a merger agreement in 1956.
The Government, charging a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act,2 sued
to enjoin the proposed merger because of its probable adverse effect on competi-
tion in the steel industry. The defendants claimed that there was little actual
or potential competition between the two merging corporations, and that the
merger would in fact stimulate competition in the steel industry because the
merged companies would be in a better position to challenge the dominant status
of United States Steel.
The court held that the proposed merger would, in its horizontal aspects,3
violate Section 7 because there was a reasonable probability that it would sub-
stantially lessen present and potential competition between the two corpora-
tions as well as eliminate Youngstown as an alternative source of supply for
steel consumers, some of whom compete with Bethlehem. In its vertical aspects,
it also violated Section 7 because it would eliminate Youngstown as a substan-
tial buyer of certain steel products. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act as amended in 1950 provides: "No corporation
shall acquire.., the whole or any part of the stock or ... assets of one or more
corporations ... where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect . . . may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a
monopoly. ' 4
In any Section 7 proceeding, the court must necessarily determine what con-
stitutes the line of commerce, i.e., the relevant product market in which the
effect of the merger is to be measured.5 The defendants, in the instant case,
urged a broad product market, one in which there were many products, seeking
thereby to minimize the effect of the merger by reducing the percentage of the
product market affected by it. The Government definition fixed narrower
lines of commerce, thus increasing, on a percentage basis at least, the effect of
the merger upon- competition. 6
1. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
Bethlehem's steel ingot capacity (the common measuring stick of size in the industry)
was 23 million tons which represented 16.3% of total industry capacity, while Youngs-
town had a capacity of 6.5 million tons or 4.6% of industry capacity.
2. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952).
3. A horizontal merger is one in which organizations on the same production or distribu-
tion levels combine. The primary effect of an acquisition of one producer by another
producer is to deprive consumers of a source of supply. There is also, of course, a lessen-
ing of competition among the rival producers.
Vertical mergers, on the other hand, take place between organizations on different dis-
tribution levels. Here the merger would most likely affect the sellers who, after losing a
market for their product, would be forced to find new customers.
4. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 US.C. § 18 (1952).
5. Brillo Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (C.C.I. Transfer Binder) ff 27243 (FTC May 23,
1958).
6. Percentage of market, however, is not the sole test used by the courts in ascertaining
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The court sustained the Government's proposed lines of commerce relying
on the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in United States v. du Pont & Co., 7
the most authoritative definition of a relevant product market under the Clay-
ton Act. There the Court defined a line of commerce as that product or series
of products which have sufficient peculiar characteristics and uses to constitute
them sufficiently distinct from all other products.8
The court, in the present case, found that many of the individual steel prod-
ucts produced by the defendants constituted separate lines of commerce. At the
same time, however, it held that the steel industry as a whole must also be
considered as a single line of commerce. The court, in arriving at this con-
clusion, used the same test. The apparent inconsistency in finding each end
steel product a separate line of commerce and, at the same time, the entire
industry itself a line of commerce, was resolved by the court by declaring that
"the products of the iron and steel industry are generally distinct one from the
other and as a group distinct from the products of other industries."9
The defendants offered two concepts in an effort to determine the "line of
commerce," production flexibility and product interchangeability. Both con-
cepts would put many divers products in the same market. Production flexi-
bility was the test employed by the trial court, and later endorsed by the Su-
preme Court, in defining a product market within the meaning of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act 10 in United States v. Columbia Steel Co.," an antimerger
action brought prior to the amendment of Section 7. This theory defines a line
of commerce on the basis of the producer's over-all production capabilities.' 2
substantial effect on the market. Indeed, courts have espoused the test of "qualitative
substantiality," thereby taking into consideration all other economic factors which affect
the industry in question. In fact, these courts reject the theory that percentages alone
are the determining factor in finding monopolies, lessening of competition or centralization
of economic power. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); Brillo
Mfg. Co., supra note 5.
7. 353 U.S. 586 (1957). It is interesting to note that this was the first action in which
§ 7 was employed in an effort to defeat a vertical merger. See Note, 26 Fordham L. Rev.
583 (1957).
8. 353 U.S. at 593-94. In applying this principle the Supreme Court found that auto-
motive finishes and fabrics are sufficiently distinct from all other finishes and fabrics to
constitute them a line of commerce, thus drawing narrow lines of commerce. The Court
obviously intended that automotive finishes and automotive products each constituted sep-
arate lines of commerce, although a strict reading of the Court's words could lead to a
conclusion that the two obviously dissimilar products were to be grouped together.
9. 168 F. Supp. at 594. (Emphasis added.) Thus, a determination that the entire steel
industry is a line of commerce is not based on a production flexibility concept but rather
on the idea that the steel industry is peculiar unto itself and each product of it is in turn
peculiar unto itself.
10. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1952).
11. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
12. Ibid. The Court in the Columbia Steel case found that "if rolled steel producers
can make other products as easily as plates and shapes, then the effect of the removal of
Consolidated's demand for plates and shapes must be measured not against the market for
plates and shapes alone, but for all comparable rolled products." Id. at 510.
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For example, where a company has a large production capacity which can be
easily allocated to the production .of many finished products of the same
general class, the line of commerce should not be the particular finished prod-
ucts but the entire line of finished products for which the company's facilities
can be readily adapted or converted. Applying this theory to the legal con-
cept of a line of commerce, the share of a market of a producer would be meas-
ured against all the finished and potential products which come from the same
production source.
Judge Weinfeld, in the present case, held that production flexibility, although
a proper test in a Section 2 action, was not the applicable test in this Seotion
17 proceeding.13 The court reasoned that since the purpose of Section 7 was
to nip monopolistic tendencies in the bud, a test narrower than production
flexibility was required.' 4 In addition, it was observed that since the proposed
merger had substantial effects on all distribution levels of the steel industry,
the test of production flexibility, which focused primarily on the producer's
capabilities, was sterile.' 5
The test of interchangeability of products was used by the Supreme Court
in United States v. duPont & Co.,'0 to ascertain the market in which cellophane
13. Support is given to this position in that Congress did not intend that the courts
apply the Sherman Act tests to § 7. S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
14. The courts in applying the antitrust laws use different standards in determining
different markets where the objectives of action before them are different. Thus, where an
action is brought under § 2 of the Sherman Act alleging a conspiracy to monopolize a
particular product, the court found the relevant product market to be very narrow. If,
however, the action was to determine if a monopoly exists in a certain area of trade,
because of the difference in the nature of the action the product market would be much
broader. Compare United States v. du Pont & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), with Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
The difference in purpose between § 7 and § 2 is great. The former has as its objective
prevention of monopoly by enjoining any merger which would probably substantially lessen
competition. Section 2, on the other hand, is directed at monopolization or attempts to
monopolize. In determining what product markets should be it would seem, if only a
substantial lessening of competition is required to find violation, that the product markets
should be narrower while, if monopoly is to be found, the product market should be
broader. Thus, different tests to different markets must be the method used to fulfil the
different purposes of the sections.
15. The court reasoned that producers, even when they do have the ability, are reluctant
to shift their production facilities, and hence, it would be unrealistic to 'determine the
market by that concept. The FTC, in Matter of Crown Zelerbach Corp., Trade Reg. Rep.
(C.C.H. Transfer Binder) UI 26923 (FTC Jan. 10, 1958), like the court in the instant case,
looked not at the economic concept and its theoretical probabilities, but rather at the
reasonable probability that producers would shift their production facilities after the pro-
posed merger had taken place.
Where the test employed by the Supreme Court in the Columbia Steel case determined
the market on the theoretical ability of the producers to continue substantial competition
by realigning their facilities, the test under § 7 would necessarily'be applied only if there
is a strong probability that in fact producers will switch their capabilities.
16. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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competed. This action, like Columbia Steel, 7 was brought under Section
2 of the Sherman Act. The theory of interchangeability of products suggests
that all products which have substantially the same uses and can be inter-
changed by the consumer to fit his needs should be considered a single market.
In order to employ this theory as a legal test, the products supposedly inter-
changeable must have additional similarities.' The products must not only
be functionally interchangeable but also must have such common characteristics
so far as quality and price are concerned that fluctuations in any of these
would result in consumers shifting from one product to the other to fulfil
their needs.
The present court emphatically rejected the interchangeability test, holding it
inapplicable to a Section 7 proceeding.' 9 Its refusal to place nonsteel products in
the same line of commerce with steel products was predicated on the finding that
steel products have characteristics which make them distinct from all other com-
parable products.20 The court did not, however, reject the possibility that
in certain situations two distinct products made from different substances
might be included in the same Section 7 line of commerce, for it said that
"interchangeability . .. [cannot] be ignored-a high degree of interchange-
ability may under certain circumstances make ... [several similar products]
more or less the same product." 2' The test which must ultimately be met, in Sec-
tion 7 actions, is that of peculiar characteristics. The fact that products are suf-
ficiently interchangeable to be placed in a Section 2 market will not necessarily
require their inclusion in the same line of commerce in a Section 7 action.p
The court seemed to recognize a certain elasticity in the peculiar character-
istics test which allows for its reasonable application to varying factual situ-
ations. The application of any Section 2 criteria, it would seem, is limited, how-
ever, to the extent that it must be compatible with the standards inherent in the
test of peculiar characteristics. 23
In this respect, the decision is at odds with the reasoning of American
17. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
18. A track spike plated with gold which costs twenty dollars and a track spike of steel,
costing one dollar, might have the same function and can be used interchangeably. How-
ever, it would be incongruous to claim they are in the same product market for the pur-
poses of an antitrust suit because there would be no cross-elasticity of demand between
the two products. See United States v. du Pont & Co., supra note 16, at 396; Note, 54
Colum. L. Rev. 580 (1954).
19. 168 F. Supp. at 593.
20. The court in this regard declared that "each has unique physical characteristics, is
distinct one from another, has different end uses, and is recognized by steel producers and
consumers as a distinct product. Each has its own competitive standards and markets.
Finally, there are no effective substitutes for any of them." Id. at 593.
21. Id. at 594 n.36.
22. Cf. Matter of Brillo Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (C.C.H. Transfer Binder) ff 27243
(FTC May 23, 1958).
23. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Matter




Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.2 4 In the latter case, both
the trial and appellate courts, applying the criterion of interchangeability
to a Section 7 action, reasoned that cane sugar and beet sugar were in the
same line of commerce. If this is to be accepted as a proper test for deter-
mining a Section 7 line of commerce, the conclusion to be drawn is that courts,
in determining Section 7 actions might occasionally revert to a Section 2
criterion. One of the dangers inherent in the adoption of a rule allowing
courts wide discretion in the use of the several tests employed in suits brought
under different sections of antitrust laws is that a corporation may justifiably
hesitate to merge because of the uncertainty of the test which might be applied
in a Section 7 proceeding. Thus, a corporation, which could legitimately merge,
may hesitate for fear of becoming engaged in costly litigation with no reason-
able certainty of success.2 5
The present court's refusal to apply the test of interchangeability, and its
opinion that, in any circumstances, it can only effect products so alike as to
be almost the same, would seem, in view of congressional intent and the test
laid down in du Pont, the more reasonable approach.
A collateral question arises from the application of the peculiar character-
istics test in Section 7 actions. Is that test to be employed in determining
product -markets in actions brought under other sections of the antitrust laws?
The purpose of Section 7 is basically different from the purpose of, for instance,
Section 2V6 In the first instance, the courts must merely find a lessening of
competition in any line of commerce in any section of the country. In the sec-
ond instance, the court must find a monopoly or an intent to monopolize. Just
as it would be improper to apply Section 2 tests to a Section 7 market, it would
seem equally incorrect to do the converse.
Defendants contended that the proposed merger would have a beneficial
effect on the steel industry insofar as the new corporation would challenge
the dominant position of the giant United States Steel Corporation. The
court ruled that this contention could not be considered where the merger
violated Section 7 by substantially lessening competition in the relevant line
of commerce in some section of the country.27 Will the courts, however,
adhere to this position in all situations? Although Judge Weinfeld's opinion
,here is sweeping and strongly worded, it does not follow that under any circum-
stances a merger in the steel industry would not be allowed. It would be
quite reasonable to assume that a merger of two small steel producers, or a
merger of a giant the size of Bethlehem Steel and a very small producer,
would be permissible where the beneficial effects of that merger would so out-
weigh any possibility of a lessening in competition within the industry itself
2 8
24. 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
25. Cf. Comment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1269 (1958).
26. 168 F. Supp. at 592.
27. Id. at 617.
28. In comparing the Government's proposed decree with the final decree in the instant
case, it is interesting to note that the court rejected the Government's proposed final decree
which provided a restraint against the defendants from acquiring any other organization
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Assault - Single Act Against Two Individuals Constitutes One Crime.-
Petitioner, upon completion of the first of two consecutive ten year sentences
imposed after a conviction on two different counts of assaulting two federal
officers with a deadly weapon, in violation of a federal statute,- moved to cor-
rect the second consecutive sentence on the ground that the firing of a single
discharge from a shotgun wounding two federal officers was a single assault
within the meaning of the statute and rendered him liable to one punishment
only. Petitioner's motion was denied by the District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States, one Justice dissenting, 2
reversed. The Court held that a single discharge of a shotgun, although
affecting more than one federal officer, constituted a single violation of the
statute. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958).
The question before the Supreme Court was whether a single act in violation
of a single criminal statute producing multiple consequences is a single or
multiple violation of the statute involved.
in the steel industry without first showing affirmatively to the court that the acquisition
would not substantially lessen competition. Instead, the court decreed that the two de-
fendants were enjoined from merging and expressly limited its direction to that extent.
The court seems to indicate that possibly, in some situations, a merger between one
of the defendants and another steel producer would not be unreasonable.
1. Petitioner was convicted of violating the Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 231, § 62, 35
Stat. 1100 (now 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1952)) which provided: "Whoever shall forcibly resist,
oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with any person . . . [who is a federal officer] while
engaged in the performance of his official duties ... shall be . . . imprisoned not more than
three years . . . and whoever, in the commission of any of the acts described in this
section, shall use a deadly or dangerous weapon shall be . . . imprisoned not more than
ten years ......
2. Mr. Justice Clark dissented on a procedural issue without reaching the merits of the
case. It was his contention that the petitioner could not make a motion to correct the second
sentence because this remedy was not available under the circumstances. According to the
dissent, the main issue was a factual one which the lower court should have considered
(the lower court record was unclear as to how many shots were fired by the petitioner),
and this error should have been raised by appeal. Mr. Justice Clark, to support his position,
cited the case of Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 181-82 (1947), where it was said that "if
defendants who accept the judgment of conviction and do not appeal can later renew
their attack on the judgment by habeas corpus, litigation in these criminal cases will be
interminable."
The majority disposed of this issue, in what Mr. Justice Clark considered an ad hoc man-
ner, by deciding that inasmuch as the availability of the collateral remedy hadn't been raised
in the courts below, and the fact that there was only meager argument of the issue, the
Court would decide the merits of the case and construe the statute whereunder the
collaterally attacked conviction was had without formulating a view as to availability of
a collateral remedy in another case where the question is properly raised. The procedural
question is not considered further in this casenote.
The Supreme Court originally affirmed the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit in a
4 to 4 decision without opinion. Ladner v. United States, 355 U.S. 282, rehearing
granted, 356 U.S. 969 (1958).
This problem is to be distinguished from several other closely related situa-
tions. First to be distinguished is a situation in which there is a violation of a
single statute by a number of acts. In such a case the defendant is guilty of a
separate offense for each act; the test applied is whether each offense requires
a modicum of proof or intent that the others do not, or, in other words, will
each stand on its own feet.3 The second situation is that in which the defendant
violates a number of statutes by a single act; the Supreme Court has reasoned
that when separate punishments are prescribed for two or more criminal statutes
enacted at different times, it is not the intent of Congress that a single act
violating all should be treated as a single offense.4 The final situation is en-
countered when an attempt is made to sever a single continuing act so that it
can become several distinct offenses in violation of a single statute. The latter
situation is illustrated by the case of In re Snow,5 wherein the defendant, under
three separate indictments, was convicted of cohabiting with seven women
for three different years. Three separate consecutive sentences were imposed,
one for each year involved. The Supreme Court held that there was only
one violation of the statute and the division into three. separate periods was
arbitrary because the offense was a continuing one and could be committed
but once from the time it commenced until it ended with the prosecution of
the defendant. In the old English case of Crepps v. Durden,6 a baker was con-
victed of four separate offenses by selling four loaves of bread to four different
people in violation of a statute prohibiting the exercise of an ordinary trade or
calling on a Sunday. On appeal, Lord Mansfield found only one offense. He
construed the legislative intent as simply punishing a man for doing work on
a Sunday.
The problem in the instant case arises whenever Congress, in enacting a
particular statute, fails to set out the allowable unit of prosecution. The "leni-
ency" approach was first employed in United States v. Universal Credit Corp.,7
where the sole question before the court was "what Congress has made the
allowable unit of prosecution. . .. ,,8 Faced with two possible interpretations
of the statute then under consideration, the Supreme Court noted that "when
choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has
3. Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915), where defendant was convicted of violating
a federal statute which proscribed the cutting or injuring of any mail bag with felonious
intent. The defendant cut six bags on the same day in the same transaction and was
given consecutive sentences for each offence. The Court construed the statute as a protec-
tion for each mail bag inasmuch as the evidence of the cutting of one bag would have
been insufficient to warrant conviction upon the others without proof of additional facts
though the intent of the defendant was the same.
4. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958). See also Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299 (1932).
5. 120 U.S. 274 (1887).
6. Cowper 640, 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1777). "There is no idea conveyed by the act
itself, that, if a tailor sews on the Lord's day, every stitch he takes is a separate offence
[sic] on one and the same day." 120 U.S. at 284.
7. 344 U.S. 218 (1952).
8. Id. at 221.
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made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to
require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.
We should not derive criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication." 9
That rationale was again applied in Bell v. United States,10 where the
defendant on one trip transported two women across state lines for im-
moral purposes. He was indicted and convicted upon two counts for a vio-
lation of the Mann Act" and sentenced to two and a half years on each count,
the sentences to run consecutively. The Supreme Court, not finding any
explicit evidence in the legislative history of the statute which would indicate
a determinable unit of prosecution, held that the defendant committed a single
offense and concluded that where "Congress does not fix the punishment for
a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against
turning a single transaction into multiple offenses .... ,,12
In the instant case the Court was for the first time presented with this prob-
lem in an assault case. Here the question of fact was whether the de-
fendant wounded both officers with a single discharge of his shotgun or
whether several shots were fired. The lower courts found it unnecessary to
decide that question, holding that a single firing of a gun resulting in the
wounding of two officers constituted two separate offenses under the statute.
The prosecution contended that the statute was designed to protect federal
officers from the infliction or threat of personal harm while in the performance
of their duties. There had, therefore, to be an offense for each officer threat-
ened and each officer was, in effect, a unit of prosecution. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, adopting this view, held that "the evidence here would
have been sufficient to warrant the conviction of an assault upon either of
the officers without any showing of the fact of an injury to the other."' 3
There is some authority, but only in a minority of state courts, for the propo-
sition that there are as many separate and distinct offenses as there are
persons affected.' 4 In reviewing the legislative history of the statute the Su-
preme Court found nothing to enlighten it. Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for
the majority, felt that just as plausible an argument could be made that
9. Id. at 221-22.
10. 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1952).
12. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955).
13. Ladner v. United States, 230 F.2d 726, 729 (5th Cir. 1956).
14. In People v. De Casaus, 150 Cal. App. 2d 274, 309 P.2d 835 (1957), an involuntary
manslaughter by operation of an automobile was held to constitute a separate offense for
each person killed and defendant was given one year for each of six persons killed. See
People v. Lagormarsino, 97 Cal. App. 2d 92, 217 P.2d 124 (1950); People v. Brannon,
70 Cal. App. 225, 233 Pac. 88 (1925); Hearn v. State, 55 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1951) (larceny
from different owners by the same act at the same time); People v. Allen, 368 Ill.
368, 14 N.E.2d 397 (1938), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 511 (1939); Commonwealth v.
Browning, 146 Ky. 770, 143 S.W. 407 (1912) (malicious shooting, both parties being
wounded by the same bullet); Keeton v. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 522, 18 S.W. 359 (1892)
(assault and robbery); State v. Martin, 154 Ohio St. 539, 96 N.E.2d 776 (1951); Fay v.




the congressional aim was to prevent hindrance to the execution of official duty,
and thus to assure the carrying out of federal purposes and interests, and was not to
protect federal officers except as incident to that aim . . . [the statute also makes
it unlawful] forcibly to resist, oppose, impede, intimidate or interfere with such
officers. . . For example, the locking of the door of a building to prevent the
entry of officers intending to arrest a person within would be an act of hindrance
denounced by the statute. We cannot find clearly from the statute, even when read
in the light of its legislative history, that the Congress intended that the person
locking the door might commit as many crimes as there are officers denied entry.' 5
The Court concluded that, since both interpretations were possible because
of the unclear legislative history, they would apply the rule of United States
v. Universal Credit Corp., and would accept the less harsh alternative. By
taking this position the Supreme Court of the United States has aligned itself
with the majority of the state courts which have held in like circumstances
that a single offense was committed. 16
The purpose of criminal prosecution is punishment of offenses against the
15. 358 U.S. at 175-76. Such a result might indeed be ludicrous where the legislative
intent is supposedly dear. Thus, in a case where the statutory offense was betting, it was
held that seventy-five rounds of poker at a single sitting constituted seventy-five separate
offenses. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923).
16. Hurst v. State, 24 Ala. App. 47, 129 So. 714 (1930); State v. Gardner, 112 Conn.
121, 151 AtI. 349 (1930) (libel against two persons in a single writing constitutes but one
criminal offense); State v. Wheelock, 214 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617 (1933) (automobile
manslaughter with more than one victim); State v. Cosgrove, 103 NJ.L. 412, 135 AtI. 871
(1927); People ex reL. Flinn v. Barr, 259 N.Y. 104, 181 N.E. 64 (1932), wherein the accused
was charged with separate indictments for the crime of manslaughter for the death of
several persons in a fire resulting from his wrongful act of failing to install a system of
automatic sprinklers in the building in which the fire occurred, the New York Court of
Appeals held that there was only one crime and that there could only be one indictment;
Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 21 S.W.2d 400 (1929); Sadberry v. State, 39 Tex. Crim.
466, 46 S.W. 639 (1898) (one shot wounded four men); State v. Levand, 37 Wyo. 372,
262 Pac. 24, rehearing denied, 37 Wyo. 372, 263 Pac. 623 (1928). Cf. People v. Moran, 246
N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35 (1927), where an assault on two officers merged for purposes of a
felony murder prosecution. Some enlightened lower federal courts have also taken this
position. See Rayborn v. United States, 234 F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 1956), where defendant, a
fugitive from justice, transported in interstate commerce a number of firearms and am-
munition simultaneously on a single trip from Kentucky to New York. This was held
to be but one offense under a statute proscribing interstate transportation of any firearm
or ammunition by a fugitive from justice, and there could be no prosecution on separate
counts for each of the various weapons and pieces of ammunition contained in the ship-
ment. In Smith v. United States, 211 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1954), a mailman stole two
letters and was indicted and convicted on two counts under a federal statute proscribing
such theft. The indictment failed to indicate whether there was any difference in the time
or place of the letter's theft or that either was taken in response to separately formed
criminal intent. The theft of both letters was either simultaneous or continuous. The
court held that although the letters were addressed to different persons, there was but a
single offense and the mailman was entitled to release after completion of his first sen-
tence. For other similar cases see Kerr v. Squier, 151 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1945); Johnston
v. Lagomarsino, 88 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1937).
1959]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
state, the people as a whole or the government itself. It seeks not to requite
injuries done to separate individuals who can secure proper redress in separate
civil actions. It is perhaps the failure to observe this elementary distinction
which has produced the minority position that there are as many distinct
offenses as there are persons affected.17
Contracts-Seller's Ability Unilaterally To Change Rates Under Natural
Gas Act.-Petitioner, a natural gas company transporting gas in interstate
commerce, entered into service contracts with respondents' to supply gas.
The agreements obligated the buyer to pay for all gas delivered during the term
of the contract at the designated seller's rate schedule, "or any effective super-
seding rate schedules, on file with the Federal Power Commission."2 Subse-
quently, petitioner filed with the Federal Power Commission, pursuant to sec-
tion 4(d) of the Natural Gas Act, revised schedules effecting increased rates,
and the Commission thereupon authorized the changes. 3 The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reversed.4 The United States Supreme Court, with
three Justices dissenting, reinstated the holding of the Commission. Under the
Natural Gas Act, a natural gas company has the right to change its rates uni-
laterally, unless it has undertaken by contract not to do so. United Gas Pipe
Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103 (1958).
In 1938 Congress deemed federal regulation of the transportation and sale of
natural gas in interstate commerce necessary in the public interest.5 To this
end, the Federal Power Commission was established and given authority, under
the Natural Gas Act, to suspend the effectiveness of a schedule pending its de-
cision on the reasonableness of the rates.6
17. See Commonwealth v. Velez, 63 Pa. Super. 489 (1916).
1. Respondent Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division, a subpurchaser of the gas, is
a municipal agency not in contractual privity with the petitioner.
2. Brief for Petitioner, p. 5.
3. Federal Power Commission Order No. 295, Docket No. 9547 (1956).
4. 250 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
5. Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1952).
6. In accordance with the provisions of the Natural Gas Act §§ 4(c), (d), every
natural gas company is required to file a schedule of its rates with the Commission, and
such do not become effective until thirty days after filing. Section 4(a) of the Act au-
thorizes the Commission to pass upon the rates charged for natural gas to assure that such
charges "shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or change that is not just and
reasonable is declared to be unlawful." That section further provides: "Whenever any such
new schedule is filed, the Commission shall have authority .. . to enter upon a hearing
concerning the lawfulness of such rate, charge, classification, or service; and pending such
hearing and the decision thereon, the Commission . . .may suspend the operation of such
schedule and defer the use of such rate, charge, classification, or service, but not for a
period longer than five months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect:
. ..the Commission may, by order, require the natural-gas company to furnish a bond . . .
and, upon the completion of the hearing and decision, to order such natural-gas company
to refund, with interest, the portion of such increased rates or charges by its decision
found not justified."
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In United Gas Co. v. Mobile Gas Corp.,7 the Supreme Court noted that the
Act "evinces no purpose to abrogate private rate contracts as such. To the
contrary, by requiring contracts to be filed with the Commission, the Act ex-
pressly recognizes that rates to particular customers may be set by individual
contracts."8 In denying the seller's ability to file new rates with the Commission
where a contract expressly provided for fixed rates, the Supreme Court there
found nothing in the Act from which can be inferred any right, not otherwise
possessed, in a natural gas company unilaterally to change its contract.9 This
holding was construed by the lower court, in the instant case, to mean that the
seller, where there is a contract involved, can never unilaterally change the rate,
regardless of the provisions of that contract.10
The seller, in Mobile, had by contract bound itself to furnish gas throughout
the contract term at a fixed and specified price. In the present case, however,
the agreement provided for rates pursuant to the schedule then on file or subse-
quently fixed by "effective superseding rate schedules."'- It is precisely this
difference which the majority found controlling. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking
for the Court, interpreted Mobile to mean not that the Act precluded a seller
from changing its rates, but rather it did not authorize the seller to abrogate the
specific price provisions of the contract.' 2 Thus, where the buyer has bound
itself to pay a "going" rate as determined by the schedules filed with and ap-
proved by the Commission, the seller is contractually free to alter its rates
pursuant to the provisions of the Act. According to the majority, the Natural
Gas Act was enacted to serve a dual purpose, viz., the protection of consumers
from excessive charges, and also to safeguard the natural gas industry in whose
stability the public has a vital stake.' 3 Thus, the Court reasoned, if economic
7. 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
8. Id. at 338. This is in marked contrast to the Interstate Commerce Act, which requires
that rates to all shippers be uniform. Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56
(1908).
9. The Mobile Court simply interpreted § 4(d) as meaning "that no change-neither a
unilateral change to an ex parte rate nor an agreed-upon change to a contract--can be made
by a natural gas company without proper notice to the Commission." 350 U.S. at 343.
10. "Under the rule in Mobile, for the Commission to review rates under the more
expeditious procedure of § 4(e), the seller must bring to the Commission a negotiated
agreement." 250 F.2d at 406.
11. Brief for Petitioner, p. S.
12. "The obvious implication is that, except as specifically limited by the Act, the
rate-making powers of natural gas companies were to be no different from those they
would possess in the absence of the Act: to establish ex parte, and change at will, the
rates offered to prospective customers; or to fix by contract, and change only by mutual
agreement, the rate agreed upon with a particular customer." United Gas Co. v. Mobile
Gas Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 343 (1956).
13. 358 U.S. at 113. "The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of 'just
and reasonable' rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. ...
From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be enough revenue
not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These
include service on the debt and dividends on the stock." Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
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conditions necessitate an increase in rates, to deny the seller the initial right to
bargain for this increase might well cause a deterioration in the financial position
of the companies with resultant loss in products for consumer enjoyment. The
buyer is not without remedy. The schedules must be submitted to the Com-
mission for review and approval. 14 The Act provides further safeguards even
where the buyer has agreed to the changes. 15
The minority found no fundamental difference between the contract before
the Court in Mobile and the present agreements; in both, the principle remained
that the seller can not ex parte alter the rates. Reasoning that Congress sought
to protect consumer interest under the Act, the dissent would therefore require
bilateral agreement with respect to new charges. 16 The minority did not con-
sider a "going" rate clause as an agreement by the buyer to pay a new rate.
Rather, the dissenting Justices construed the clause as a mere agreement to
agree, and that until the seller had secured the buyer's consent to a new rate,
no new schedule could be filed with the Commission.
Limiting the Mobile decision to its facts, it appears that the holding therein
was based upon contract law. However, the minority treated it as a policy
decision, and would preclude the seller from unilaterally changing its rates
regardless of contract provisions. The minority is on shaky grounds when it
suggests that Congress' sole purpose in enacting the Natural Gas Act was the
protection of consumer interest. It seems more reasonable to agree with the
majority that Congress intended a balance of buyer and seller interests, provid-
ing the means whereby the seller might establish new rates under section 4 of
the Act, and, at the same time, permitting the buyer to show cause why such
proposed rates might be unreasonable, and also the right to initiate proceedings
for a reduction in rates under section 5. In any case, the authority to strike
down any new schedule, even where the contract provides for the filing of new
rates, remains with the Commission. Under the minority view, the Commission
would take on responsibility for initiating new rates under section 4; however,
section 5(a) specifically grants such authority.' 7 As a practical matter, then,
new rates could become effective only after Commission hearings, whereas sec-
tion 4(d) provides that a schedule becomes operative thirty days after filing.
It does not appear that Congress intended by the Natural Gas Act to destroy
the contractual rights of either party. If not, both parties are free to fix contract
terms, subject always to the authority of the Commission to deal with that
situation where one party, because of circumstances, may be in a position to
dictate terms to the other.
14. Natural Gas Act §§ 4(a), (c), (d), supra note 6.
15. The paramount regulatory authority of the Commission could alter these rates
under § 5(a) which provides: "Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its
own motion . . . shall find that any rate . . . by any natural-gas company . . . is unjust,
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall determine the
just and reasonable rate ... and shall fix the same by order .... "
16. In support of its opinion, the minority argued that because the controlling powers
of the Commission were slight, Congress must have intended the full protective weight of
the Act to be employed in favor of the consumer. 358 U.S. at 120.
17. Natural Gas Act § 5(a), supra note 15.
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Copyrights - Right of Administrator c.t.a. To Renew and Extend Copy-
right.-By his will, the decedent, an author domiciled in New York, gave the
royalties accruing on his copyrights to his home town. Defendant committee
was organized to receive said royalties on behalf of the town. In the twenty-
eighth year of the original copyrights, the administrators c.t.a. and the sister of
decedent, his sole surviving next of kin, duly filed for and received copyright
renewal certificates. Controversy existed only as to who would receive the bene-
fits of the copyright renewals. The district court held that an administrator
c.t.a. has the statutory power of copyright renewal for the benefit of the dece-
dent's legatees, and, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed. Section 24 of the Copyright Law entitles an adminis-
trator c.t.a. to renew a copyright. Gibran v. National Comm. of Gibran, 255
F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 828 (1958).
Under the original Copyright Act of 1790, the right of renewal was given to
the author, his executor, administrator or assignee. However, the act of 1831
and all subsequent acts omitted the assignee and administrator from the list.'
The congressional committee report on the Act of 1909 stated that "it was not
the intention to permit the administrator to apply for renewal, but to permit
the author who had no wife or children to bequeath by will the right to apply for
renewal."12 Consistent with this expressed purpose are sections 24 and 28 of the
present Copyright Law.3 The former permits "the author ... if still living, or
the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living, or if
such author, widow, widower, or children be not living, then the author's
executor, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin ... " to apply for copyright
renewal in the twenty-eighth year of the original copyright. The latter section
provides that "copyrights secured under this title or previous copyright laws
of the United States ... may be bequeathed by will."
Analysis of the decedent's testamentary disposition 4 in the case at bar led
the surrogate's court and the district court 5 in turn to hold that the testator's
intention was clearly to bequeath all rights with respect to his copyrights,
original and renewal, to his home town.6 Decedent's sister contested the right
1. Barnes, Federal Code § 9045 (1919).
2. H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1909) ; adopted as the report of the
Senate Committee on Patents, S. Rep. No. 1108, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1909).
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 24, 28 (1947). The Act has since been amended in several particulars,
but none of the changes are pertinent to the present case.
4. The will stated that "the royalties on my copyrights, which copyrights I under-
stand can be extended upon request by my heirs for an additional period of twenty-eight
years after my death, are to go to my home town." The construction of the Surrogate's
Court of New York County set forth that "the gift of the royalties on the copyrights ...
carries with it the gift of the copyrights to the town of Bechari . . ." the testator's home
town. 255 F.2d at 122.
5. Gibran v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
6. Federal courts generally lack jurisdiction to entertain probate proceedings and actions
pertaining to the administration of decedents' estates. They have assumed jurisdiction of
actions between citizens of different states involving the validity and construction of wilLs.
1 Heaton, Surrogate's Courts § 31, at 144 (6th ed. Warren 1958).
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of the administrators c.t.a.7 to renew the copyright for the town's benefit, since
the Act limited the privilege to the executors of the deceased author. She argued
that the renewal right should pass by intestacy to her as sole surviving next
of kin, citing Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp.8 as authority for the proposi-
tion that an administrator c.t.a. is without power to renew a copyright under
section 24 of the Act. In that case, however, the administrator c.t.a. sought a re-
newal after the twenty-eighth year of the original copyright, at which time no
one is permitted to renew the original copyright and, thus, the administrator
c.t.a. was barred not by section 24 but rather by lapse of time.
Where an author dies intestate his administrator has no right of copyright
renewal, since the right to renew does not flow from the author's estate but is
derived from the statute.9 It has been said that the statute prohibits renewal by
an administrator because he, unlike an executor, may represent no relative and
no wish of the author.' 0 An administrator with will annexed is, however, gen-
erally held to have powers co-extensive with those of an executor." The dis-
tinction between them is largely one in name only. 12  The administrator
c.t.a. may be appointed where no person is named as executor in the will, or if
for any reason there is no executor qualified to act during the administration of
the testator's estate.'3  "Where letters of administration with will annexed are
granted, the will of the deceased shall be observed and performed; and the
administrators with such will have the rights and powers, and are subject to the
same duties, as if they had been named executors in the will.1 4 In Page v.
Patton,15 the United States Supreme Court also held that an administrator
with will annexed was entitled to exercise all of the powers of an executor.
7. More commonly termed an administrator with will annexed.
8. 273 Fed. 908 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 758 (1923). The authoress died,
leaving no surviving spouse or children, and bequeathed her residuary estate "including
copyright on my books" to her next of kin. When the statutory renewal year began,
the estate had already been distributed and the executors had been discharged. Several
of the next of kin applied for copyright renewal during the renewal period. Sometime
afterwards, an administrator c.t.a. was appointed. The court held that the next of kin,
although acting through a fraction of their number, had a right to secure renewal. "The
power of applying for copyright which springs into existence after the executor's dis-
charge must vest somewhere. It cannot vest in the executor because there is none . . . and
similarly it cannot vest in legatees as such. It must therefore vest in the next of kin."
Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 290 Fed. 804, 805 (2d Cir. 1923).
9. Danks v. Gordon, 272 Fed. 821 (2d Cir. 1921); White-Smith Music Publishing Co.
v. Goff, 180 Fed. 256 (1st Cir. 1910).
10. Harris v. Coca-Cola Co., 73 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1934).
11. Hollenbach v. Born, 206 App. Div. 533, 202 N.Y. Supp. 170 (2d Dep't 1923). Other
jurisdictions have similarly held that administrators c.t.a. have the same power as execu-
tors. Green v. Russell, 103 Mich. 638, 61 N.W. 885 (1895); Scott v. Monks, 16 R.I. 225,
14 Atl. 860 (1888).
12. In re Murphy, 144 N.Y. 557, 562, 39 N.E. 691, 692 (1895); Robins v. McClure,
100 N.Y. 328, 340, 3 N.E. 663, 669 (1885).
13. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act § 133.
14. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act § 225. (Emphasis added.)
15. 30 U.S. 304 (1831).
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Judge Hand's opinion in the instant case placed considerable emphasis on the
proposition that if the administrator c.t.a. was not given the power of copyright
renewal, no one could exercise the power since there would not be the "absence
of a will" which expressly conditions the privilege of the next of kin. The court
distinguished the Silverman case, wherein the next of kin were given the power
of copyright renewal, although the author's will had, on its face, bequeathed
the benefits of copyright renewal. The Silverman court reasoned that the estate
had already been distributed and the executor named in the will had been dis-
charged prior to the one year renewal period. Although the "rights of the next
of kin under the statute arise 'in the absence of a will' . . . there is here a com-
plete absence of a will affecting this renewal right."'16
If the instant decision had not given an administrator c.t.a. the power of
copyright renewal, although a decedent may have clearly expressed his intent
to bequeath the benefits of copyright renewal, his failure to name an executor,
or the death or incompetency of a named executor, would preclude his bequest,
since a strict statutory interpretation requires that only the executor exercise
the right. To permit such a result would frustrate not only testator's bequest,
but also the clearly expressed congressional purpose of permitting an author to
bequeath the power of copyright renewal.
Equity-Enjoining a Crime.-Defendants, the owner of a chain of super-
markets and a wholesale drug dealer, were charged with selling or conspiring
to sell, in violation of a state statute, certain popular patent medicines (among
them Alka-Seltza, Pepto-Bismol and Vick's Va-Tro-Nol) in self-service super-
markets without the supervision of a licensed pharmacist. The state sought to
enjoin the sales. The trial court found that the acts were in violation of the
pertinent statute' but refused injunctive relief on the ground that the state had
failed to show that public health was endangered or that the statutory remedy
was inadequate. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, one justice dissenting,
reversed and granted a new trial. The court held that the statute, though ex-
clusively penal in nature, was primarily designed for the protection of public
health, and a prima facie case for equitable relief is made out where organized
resistance to enforcement of the statute is offered by wholesale druggists, and
enforcement of the penal sanctions would produce a multiplicity of suits. State
v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., - Minn. -, 92 N.W.2d 103 (1958).
In medieval England, due to the disorders of the times and the weakness of
the central government, the chancellor undertook to protect lives and property
by enjoining lawless activities. As times became more peaceful, popular distrust
16. 290 Fed. at 805. Whether this reasoning is truly consistent with that advanced
by Judge Hand in the present case is perhaps open to debate. The former relies on the
assumption that where the estate covered by a testamentary disposition has been dis-
tributed and the executor discharged prior to the copyright renewal period, the right of
copyright renewal passes by intestacy although the author may have expressed a dear
testamentary intent that it be bequeated to named legatees.
1. Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 151.15, .25 (1946).
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of the king and parliamentary opposition caused the chancellor to exercise
sparingly this power to restrain crime.2 In the nineteenth century, however, the
courts of equity again began to restrain purprestures, i.e., the interference by
individuals with public highways or waterways. 3 These powers were extended
to embrace most public nuisances 4 which were also usually crimes.5 Today,
the criminality of an act is a neutral factor as far as equity is concerned.
Equity will not enjoin an act simply because it is a crime; but neither will
criminality bar equitable relief6 if the act is also one inimical to public health
or safety.7
2. Mack, The Revival of Criminal Equity, 16 Harv. L. Rev. 389 (1903).
3. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Forbes, 2 My. & Cr. 123, 40 Eng. Rep. 587 (Ch. 1836);
Attorney General v. Richardls, 2 Anst. 603, 145 Eng. Rep. 980 (Ex. 1795).
4. "Aside from purprestures, the most common type of public nuisance is the use of the
property of the plaintiff in such a manner as to injure health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the public. During the Nineteenth Century the practice of enjoining such nui-
sances at the suit of the state or some other authorized party became established. There
was little difficulty with the relief when the nuisance affected the health or safety of the
public. It was early determined that the court of equity could itself determine the existence
of such a nuisance without the aid of a decision at law." McClintock, Equity § 163 (2d
ed. 1948).
5. "The modern doctrines with reference to enjoining crimes did not develop from the
ancient equity practice, but grew out of the jurisdiction of equity to enjoin nuisances. The
vagueness of the definition of a 'nuisance' has offered a wide opportunity for the enlarge-
ment of the scope of equity in dealing with acts which may be crimes....
"After the courts had generally come to recognize their powers to restrain the use of
property in such a way as to interfere with the morals or general welfare of the community,
conduct which was almost always made a crime, it became easier to extend the same relief
to other cases where no use of property was involved, but where the defendant was pur-
suing a course of criminal conduct which inflicted injury upon the public." McClintock,
Equity § 164, at 443-44 (2d ed. 1948).
6. "The mere fact that an act or conduct is in violation of penal statute does not render
such act or conduct a public nuisance. Equity will not enjoin an act merely because its
commission will constitute a crime. The act or conduct must be such as would constitute
a public nuisance even in the absence of statute, to warrant enjoining the act or conduct.
If to allow the commission or continued commission of certain acts or conduct will result
in irreparable injury to the public, equity will enjoin such commission even though the
commission thereof is described by statute as a crime." De Funiak, Equity § 36 (1950).
See also Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N.W. 910 (1934) ; State v. Nelson, 189
Minn. 87, 248 N.W. 751 (1933); Town of Linden v. Fischer, 154 Minn. 354, 191 N.W. 901
(1923); People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 14 N.E.2d 439 (1938).
7. "In the case at bar the People would not be entitled to an injunction upon a mere
showing that the statute had been violated or that acts prohibited by the statute had been
performed, in the absence of special statutory authority. However, they go much further
than that. They allege facts showing that the acts of defendant imperil the health of the
people of the community .... The relators invoke only the ordinary powers of a court of
equity. The power . . . to restrain acts which are dangerous to human life, detrimental to
the public health and the occasion of great public inconvenience and damage is .. .pos-
sessed by all courts of equity." People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 384, 14
N.E.2d 439, 446 (1938).
The Minnesota courts have encouraged strict enforcement of the statutes in
question. They have included, for example, harmless household chemicals
within the prohibitions if there was any likelihood of medicinal use.8 It can
hardly be contended that a violation of the statute automatically menaces public
health so as to require equity's extraordinary remedies. The instant court,
however, reasoned that the pharmacy laws were enacted for the general pur-
pose of protecting public health, and that any violation thereof would create
a prima facie case for injunctive relief.9 The mere existence of the statute was
considered as conclusive evidence that a violation would endanger public health.
The penal sanctions set forth in the statute were, in the court's opinion, in-
sufficient to compel compliance. Thus, it was reasoned that the court was re-
quired to use its injunctive powers to protect the public health. This seems to
be tantamount to making the mere violation or threatened violation of the
statute cause for equitable relief. When equity acts, it does so primarily to
protect rights or property against infringement; punishment of the defendant
being a secondary, though essential, consideration. Where there is no showing
that such rights or property are irreparably endangered, courts have been loath
to use injunctive powers, primarily because the equity suit does not usually
accord the defendant a trial by jury.10 In a criminal action it denies the
defendant the benefit of the higher burden of proof imposed upon the state..'
It has also been suggested that an equity suit will make possible the imposition
of a double penalty, one for contempt of the injunction if violated, and another
fixed by the criminal statute.12
Even were there some showing of specific harm to the public it would be
8. "The mere fact that they are harmless household remedies does not except the sale
of the products from the operation of our statute unless they are also sold exclusively
for nonmedicinal purposes.... Even if they are not sold principally for medicinal purposes,
they come within the pharmacy law unless they are sold exclusively for nonmedicinal pur-
poses." Culver v. Nelson, 237 Minn. 65, 73, 54 N.W.2d 7, 12 (1952). See also State v.
F. W. Woolworth Co., 184 Minn. 51, 237 N.W. 817 (1931) (milk of magnesia); State v.
Zotalis, 172 Minn. 132, 214 N.W. 766 (1927) (aspirin).
9. "But, even conceding that the state has not on the record established evidence of
specific harm to the public, we are of the view that the state has a prima facie case, in view
of the public policy in our state that the uncontrolled sale of drugs and medicines is
inimical to public health." State v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., - Minn. -- , 92 N.W.2d 103,
113 (1958).
10. "Another effect of the injunction would be to deny one cited for contempt a trial by
jury in what is in effect a criminal case. In other words, a court, without a jury, might
convict persons of an offense which the statutes of the state make a felony, and, upon
conviction, might inflict such punishment as to the court seemed proper.
"This fact alone should limit the right to an injunction to cases in which its direct
effect is the protection of rights or property, and where it is necessary to such protection."
Heber v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 64 Colo. 352, 357, 172 Pac. 12, 14 (1918).
11. "The defendant also loses the protection of the higher burden of proof required in
criminal prosecutions and, after imprisonment and fine for violation of the equity injunc-
tion, may be subjected under the criminal law to similar punishment for the same acts."




questionable whether an injunction would, as a practical matter, afford the
public sufficient protection by simply preventing violations of the pharmacy
statutes. The dissent pointed out that no material difference exists between the
method of sale of the items in question used in supermarkets and that em-
ployed in drug stores. 13 It is also questionable whether a customer has superior
legal redress against a druggist than against a grocer.14
The state pharmacy board had banned the sale of the items in supermarkets.
The defendants ignored the board's orders and urged their customers and sub-
sidiaries to do likewise, offering legal services to those who fell afoul of the
authorities. The court reasoned that the organized resistance rendered the penal
sanctions inadequate. The trial court and the dissent took issue with this
finding.' 5 The difficulty in enforcing a penal statute has never been considered
sufficient to justify injunctive relief unless the acts complained of were also
public nuisances.' 6 Furthermore, as equity deals with unique situations and
dispenses extraordinary remedies, much necessarily must be left to the discre-
tion of the trial court.' 7 Thus, the reversal of the trial court's findings is ques-
tionable. It is a truism that an appellate court should not pass upon the deci-
sion of a trial court to give or withhold an equitable remedy unless there has
been an abuse of discretion.'"
There seems to be a contradiction in the majority's position. It finds im-
13. "If it is true that it is inherently dangerous for the public to be able to purchase
drugs in a self-service fashion, then it is apparent that curing the alleged evil which now
occurs in supermarkets and grocery stores solves only part of the problem. We cannot shut
our eyes to the fact that almost any item which does not require a prescription may be
in the same manner in a drug store without any restriction at aln upon its quantity. More-
over, it is a matter of common knowledge that in many instances it is not a pharmacist who
dispenses the merchandise but rather an inexperienced employee or the customer himself
in a self-service manner." - Minn. at -, 92 N.W.2d at 116 (1958).
14. If a customer were injured by a defective patent medicine sold under its trade name
and in the manufacturer's container, it is doubtful that the druggist would be liable in
negligence. See Tiedje v. Haney, 184 Minn. 569, 239 N.W. 611 (1931); Commissioners of
State Ins. Fund v. City Chemical Corp., 290 N.Y. 64, 48 N.E.2d 262 (1943); Singer v.
Oken, 193 Misc. 1058, 87 N.Y.S.2d 686 (N.Y. City Ct. 1949). He might, of course, have
an action for the breach of implied warranties, but such warranties could be enforced as
easily against a grocer as a druggist. See Gimenez v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390,
191 N.E. 27 (1934); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105
(1931).
15. The trial court and the dissent pointed out that, as the state had never undertaken
any criminal proceeding against the defendants, there was no evidence that a multiplicity of
suits would result, and that an injunction in the instant case would reach no more parties
than a criminal action. - Minn. at -, 92 N.W.2d at 108, 115.
16. People v. Fritz, 316 Ill. App. 217, 45 N.E.2d 48 (1942); People ex rel. Shepardson
v. Universal Chiropractors' Ass'n, 302 Ill. 228, 134 N.E. 4 (1922); State v. Maltby, 108
Neb. 578, 188 N.W. 175 (1922); Town of Clinton v. Ross, 226 N.C. 682, 40 S.E.2d 593
(1946).
17. E.g., Reliable Transfer Co. v. Blanchard, 145 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1944); Hotel Em-
ployees' Union v. Tzakis, 227 Minn. 32, 33 N.W.2d 859 (1948).




plicit in the statutes a legislative purpose to protect public health, and, at the
same time, rejects as inadequate the remedy, i.e., criminal prosecution, estab-
lished by the legislature. If this court has found defendants' acts or threatened
acts detrimental to public health because the legislature has said so, and if the
remedy provided by the legislature is inadequate, then it is for the legislature,
not the court, to provide more severe penal sanctions, or to authorize injunction
by statute.
Landlord and Tenant-Tenant's Liability for Negligence Where Lease
Contains Fire Excepting Clause.-In an action by plaintiff lessor to recover
the cost of repairs necessitated by a fire allegedly caused by lessee's negligence,
the lessee alleged as an affirmative defense that he covenanted to make all re-
pairs to the interior of the premises with "reasonable wear and tear and damage
by fire and unavoidable casualty excepted." The defense was stricken as
being legally insufficient and the defendant's motion to amend his answer was
denied by the trial court.1 On appeal, the court held that the lessee was liable
to the lessor for fire damages caused to the premises through the former's own
negligence notwithstanding the excepting clause in the lease. Galante v. Hath-
away Bakeries, Inc., 6 App. Div. 8d 142, 176 N.Y.S.2d 87 (4th Dep't 1958).
At common law a tenant was not required to make repairs necessitated by
accidental fires2 since he merely owed the lessor a duty to exercise reasonable
care and diligence in the use of the leased premises. 3 However, he was held
responsible for damages resulting from fires he negligently caused.4 This com-
mon law duty may be modified by a general covenant to repair which binds the
lessee to make all repairs,5 but a tenant will usually demand the inclusion of
excepting provisions to exculpate him from liability for injury to the premises
due to ordinary wear and tear,6 unavoidable casualty and fire.
Where "fire" is specifically excepted, it has been held that the covenant re-
lieves the tenant from liability for accidental fires,7 but whether it exculpates
the negligent tenant depends upon the intentions of the parties to the lease.
In the principal case the court, following the well recognized rules that a "con-
1. 9 Misc. 2d 19, 167 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1957). Defendant wished to amend his
answer to allege that the plaintiff, subsequent to the making of the lease, acquired insurance
to protect himself against such contingencies and he recovered thereunder.
2. Patton v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
3. United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53 (1876).
4. Ibid.
5. Anderson v. Ferguson, 17 Wash. 2d 262, 135 P.2d 302 (1943). See 32 Am. Jur.
Landlord & Tenant § 791 (1941).
6. Where the provision includes ordinary wear and tear it imposes the common law
duty of care upon the tenant. 51 CJ.S. Landlord & Tenant § 368, at 1102 (1947).
7. Basketeria Stores v. Shelton, 199 N.C. 746, 155 S.E. 863 (1930).
8. Boll v. Sharp & Dohme, Inc., 281 App. Div. 568, 121 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st Dep't
1953), aff'd, 307 N.Y. 646, 120 N.E.2d 836 (1954); Howard v. Handler Bros. & Winell,
279 App. Div. 72, 107 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 990, 106 N.E.2d 67




tract will not be construed to exempt a party from liability for his negligent act
unless such intention is expressed in unequivocal terms,"9 held that the fire
excepting provision in the lease did not clearly and explicitly exempt the tenant
from liability for negligently caused fires. Nor was the fact that the landlord
subsequently took out a fire insurance policy 10 on the premises considered in-
dicative of a general understanding between the parties that the tenant was
thereby relieved of his liability for negligently setting fire to the premises. In
the absence of further evidence of an attempt to relieve the tenant of his obliga-
tion to make good damages suffered as a result of his negligence, the court af-
firmed his liability. The court also noted that section 227 of the New York Real
Property Law" has been interpreted to relieve the tenant of his duty to repair
under a fire exempting provision,' 2 provided it occurs without the fault or negli-
gence of the tenant.13
Excepting provisions in a lease have been variously interpreted. Some juris-
dictions have reasoned that since the landlord is generally the draftsman of the
lease and in a better bargaining position, an unconditional excepting clause
should be strictly construed against him.14 Where the lease provision exempts
both "fire and unavoidable casualty" these courts have reasoned that the parties
must have intended the provision to extend to negligently caused fires since if
"it had been intended that the fire must also be an unavoidable casualty it
would seem that there was no occasion for mentioning fire at all."'15 The phrase
"loss by fire" when used in a fire insurance policy includes both accidental and
negligent fires,' 6 and some courts have applied the same interpretation to similar
provisions in a lease, inferring that business men entering into a contract relat-
ing to property, which in the normal course of business is covered by fire in-
surance, would so construe it.17
On the other hand, courts which have strictly construed the exculpation
clause have relied on the rule that although a person may contractually exempt
himself from his own negligence, it must be done in clear and unequivocal
terms,' 8 following the view that it is generally against public policy to favor
exculpatory provisions.19 They imply that "by fire excepted" is too general an
9. See Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 271 N.Y. 36, 41, 2 N.E.2d 35, 37
(1936).
10. The agreement to lease was entered into in March of 1953, and the fire insurance
policy was purchased in August of 1955.
11. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 227. This section relieves the tenant of his common law
duty to pay rent even when the building has been destroyed.
12. Butler v. Kidder, 87 N.Y. 98 (1881).
13. Marcy v. City of Syracuse, 199 App. Div. 246, 192 N.Y. Supp. 674 (4th Dep't
1921).
14. 51 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 232(1) (1957).
15. Slocum v. Natural Products Co., 292 Mass. 455, 456, 198 N.E. 747, 748 (1935).
16. Brewer, An Inductive Approach to the Liability of the Tenant for Negligence,
-31 B.U.L. Rev. 47 (1951).
17. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Phil-Mar Corp., 166 Ohio St. 85, 139 N.E.2d 330
(1956).
18. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 262 (1957).
19. Ibid.
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exception to relieve a tenant of his tort liability. Similar clauses do not exempt
the landlord from liability for negligent acts.2 °
In recent years the courts in determining the intentions of the contracting
parties have gone outside the'contract and interpreted the provision taking into
consideration the acts and circumstances surrounding the agreement. The es-
sential element which has affected their decisions has been the absence or
existence of fire insurance on the premises paid for by the lessor 21 The defend-
ant in the instant case relies heavily upon the decision in General Mills, Inc. v.
Goldman,2 2 and the recent cases in accord with its reasoning 2 3 The federal
court there held that the fire excepting provision relieved the tenant from liabil-
ity to make repairs to the premises damaged by a fire negligently caused by that
tenant, where the parties, when entering into the lease, mutually agreed that the
lessor should take out a fire insurance policy on the premises. It may be in-
ferred from this that the landlord by taking out the policy would relieve the
tenant from liability, thereby implying that the tenant was in a sense paying
for the policy through the payment of rent.2 4
Although a tenant has an insurable interest in leased premises,25 he is at a
disadvantage in obtaining insurance which will not only cover this interest
but protect the landlord's property from the tenant's negligence. 2 6 Standard
fire insurance policies generally are not issued to protect the property of an-
other Therefore, to protect the tenant it is submitted that at the time of
the leasing agreement the tenant and landlord should obtain one fire insurance
policy which would provide coverage for both parties' interests.
Where the surrounding circumstances indicate that the parties to the contract
intended that fire insurance be taken out by the landlord, it seems more reason-
20.- Kessler v. The Ansonia, 222 App. Div. 148, 225 N.Y. Supp. 589 (1st Dep't 1927),
aff'd, 253 N.Y. 453, 171 N.E. 704 (1930); accord, Lewis Co. v. Metropolitan Realty Co.,
112 App. Div. 385, 98 N.Y. Supp. 391 (2d Dep't 1906); Levin v. Habicht, 45 Misc.
381, 90 N.Y. Supp. 349 (Sup. Ct. 1904).
21. 18 Ohio St. LJ. 423 (1957).
22. 184 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 947 (1951).
23. Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn Co., 7 Il. 2d 393, 131 N:E.2d 100 (1955);
Kansas City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich & Sons, 250 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. 1952);. United
States Fire Ins. Co. v. Phil-Mar. Corp., 166 Ohio St. 85, 139 N.E.2d 330 (1956).
24. Brewer, supra note 16, at 428.
25. Commercial Union Assur. Co. v. Jass, 36 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1929).
26. Brewer, supra note 16, at 57.
27. Ibid. Where the tenant protects his interest by the purchase of a standard fire
insurance policy, the insurance company stands to gain double premiums as the average
business-wise landlord will generally take out insurance on the property to protect his
interest. When insprance premiums are calculated, damage due to negligent fires are in-
cluded in the premiums. If the insurance company cannot sue the landlord for his negli-
gence, why should it be allowed, under the circumstances, to subrogate under the plaintiff-
landlord and recover the loss from the tenant, which he has already included in his pre-
miums? 18 Ohio St. L.J. 423 (1957).
Since the General Mills decision, insurance companies have made some effort in provid-




able to hold that the excepting provision be interpreted to exculpate the tenant
from his negligently caused fires. At the present time this is about as far as the
courts have extended the rule.
The instant case is in accord with the jurisdictions which have not excul-
pated the tenant for his negligence. 28 Although these cases have generally been
prior to the recent trend2 9 indicated by the General Mills decision, they are
distinguishable in that there was no fire insurance policy at the time of the
lease. In the principal case where the existence of the insurance policy
was subsequent to the lease and without evidence of an intent that it be
purchased to exculpate the tenant, the court could do nothing but render the
lessee liable for his negligence.
Patents - Right to Bring Suit While a Patent Is Withheld Under a
Secrecy Order.-Plaintiff filed an application for a patent in March of 1945.
The Commissioner of Patents refused to issue the patent' and entered a secrecy
order pursuant to statute.2 The secrecy order was renewed periodically and was
still pending when plaintiff instituted the present suit3 in the District Court
for the Southern District of New York under the Invention Secrecy Act of
1951, 4 after having failed to obtain a satisfactory award from the Department
of Defense. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
holding that an action cannot be maintained during the pendency of a secrecy
order on a patent. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit unanimously reversed and remanded. The court held that the In-
vention Secrecy Act of 1951 authorizes suit during the pendency of a secrecy
order, and permits the district court, if it finds that a trial would not jeopardize
the national security, to conduct its proceedings in camera. Halpern v. United
States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958).
The right to compensation for an inventor whose patent has been withheld
or delayed under section 181 of the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 is dealt with
in section 183. 5 The instant case is the first to have been brought during the
28. Morris v. Warner, 207 Cal. 498, 279 Pac. 152 (1929) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Poling,
248 Iowa 582, 81 N.W.2d 462 (1957); Brophy v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 98 Neb. 307,
152 N.W. 557 (1915); Carstens v. Western Pipe & Steel Co., 142 Wash. 259, 252 Pac.
939 (1927).
29. The recent trend which has followed the General Mills decision has been in indus-
trial states and is concerned with manufacturing lessees. If, in the instant case, the land-
lord had intended to take out fire insurance at the time of the lease agreement and the
tenant knew this intention, the result might have been different.
1. The plaintiff was notified that the refusal was due to the nature of the invention and
its importance to national security.
2. Act of July 1, 1940, ch. 501, § 1, 54 Stat. 710.
3. Plaintiff sought to recover damages resulting from the secrecy order and compensa-
tion for use of his invention by the United States.
4. 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1952).
5. The relevant portions of that section are as follows: "An applicant ...whose patent
is withheld as herein provided, shall have the right .. .to apply to the head of any de-
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pendency of a secrecy order. The decision, therefore, necessarily turned upon
the proper interpretation to be given section 183.
The statute provides alternate remedies. The first permits the applicant to
apply for compensation to the department which caused the secrecy order to
be issued after he is notified that, except for the secrecy order, his application
is otherwise in condition for allowance; failing settlement by mutual agreement,
he may bring suit in the Court of Claims or in a district court. The second
remedy provides that an owner of a patent who did not avail himself of the first
remedy shall have the right, after the date of issuance of a patent, to bring suit
in the Court of Claims. The qualifying phrase in the second remedy, limiting
it to cases where the patent has already been issued (and, therefore, the secrecy
order lifted), does not appear in the first remedy. The Government, however,
contended that where the secrecy order' was still pending, the inventor was to
be allowed only part of the first remedy, namely, the right to apply for com-
pensation to the proper department, but not the subsequent suit in the courts.
The court refused to accept this interpretation. Where one part of the statute
is so explicit as to include an express condition precedent to suit, namely, "after
the date of issuance of a patent," the court felt that it should not presume a
legislative oversight and read a similar clause into the earlier part of the statute,
silent as to any such condition. It was on this ground primarily that the court
relied in interpreting the statute as allowing the suit to proceed.
The predecessor of the present statute0 provided only one remedy which is
carried over as the second remedy under section 183. Under the former statute
the inventor's right to sue was limited to an action only "if and when he ulti-
mately receives a patent." Had Congress intended to incorporate this restric-
tion into the first remedy, it necessarily would have included it in the wording
of that part of the section. Since it did not, the conclusion is irresistible that
it did not intend such restriction to apply as a condition precedent to an action
under that part of the section.
partment or agency who caused the order to be issued for compensation for the damage
caused by the order of secrecy and/or for the use of the invention by the Government,
resulting from his disclosure. . . .The head of the department or agency is authorized,
upon the presentation of a claim, to enter into an agreement with the applicant ... in full
settlement for the damage and/or use. . . . If full settlement of the claim cannot be
effected, the head of the department or agency may award and pay to such applicant .. .
a sum not exceeding 75 per centum of the sum which the head of the department or
agency considers just compensation for the damage and/or use. A claimant may bring
suit against the United States in the Court of Claims or in the District Court of the
United States for the district in which such claimant is a resident for an amount which
when added to the award shall constitute just compensation for the damage and/or use
of the invention by the government. The owner of any patent issued upon an application
that was subject to a secrecy order issued pursuant to section 181 of this title, who did'
not apply for compensation as above provided, shall have the right, after the date of
issuance of such patent, to bring suit in the Court of Claims for just compensation for
the damage caused by reason of the order of secrecy and/or use by the Government
of the invention resulting from his disclosure."
6. Act of July 1, 1940, ch. 501, § 1, 54 Stat. 710.
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A further manifestation that Congress in section 181 intended a distinction
in remedies between that situation where a patent had been issued and where
it had not is evidenced by the terms used by the legislature in designating the
inventor in the two remedies: the first refers to the "applicant" and the "claim-
ant," whereas the second specifically uses the term "owner of the patent."
The Government argued that permitting a suit before the secrecy order has
been lifted would be contrary to the whole purpose of the Act which was to
preserve the secrecy of inventions affecting national security.7 To the plaintiff's
contention that such difficulty could be overcome by an in camera trial the
Government argued8 that such an extraordinary procedure9 could be used
only when expressly provided for by statute, and that even then such a closed
trial would not satisfy the nondisclosure requirement of the statute. The court
nevertheless found that since Congress provided for a trial during the pendency
of a secrecy order, such provision could not be illusory and, therefore, the trial
court is empowered to use its discretion to grant a trial whenever it can also
guarantee the overriding interest of national security.
The court also declined to adopt the Government's restricted interpretation
of the term "disclosure" as meaning that any disclosure was proscribed and,
therefore, mitigating against any in camera proceeding, finding that the Act
deals with unauthorized disclosure and expressly permits disclosure to an officer
of any department of the Government concerned directly with the subject mat-
ter. Such an attitude is a realistic one. An invention like the one in question'0
must be disclosed to hundreds of government scientists and technicians in the
course of its use. Testimony at a closed trial should carry no greater danger of
public disclosure. Nevertheless, the decision is merely permissive in nature, and
still leaves the trial judge power to deny trial where he feels that it cannot be
"carried out without substantial risk that secret information will be publicly
divulged."'"
This decision will be welcomed by inventors dealing in military products
whose right to full compensation might otherwise have been postponed indefi-
nitely under a secrecy order. More significant, however, is its long-range effect.
Inventors should be encouraged to work in the field of military products and
to deal with the government. 12 That encouragement will have a more salubrious
7. Section 182 of the Act declares an inventor's right to a patent is forfeit if he dis-
doses it without authorization; the inventor is also subject to criminal penalties under
section 186 for willful disclosure.
8. Brief for Appellee, pp. 14-16.
9. There is little case history on trials in camera. This is not surprising when it is
considered that records of such trials, and usually their appeals, would not be reported.
10. The invention was described only as one which deals with a manner and means
whereby an object may escape observation and detection by radar. 258 F.2d at 37.
11. 258 F.2d at 44.
12. See Schmidt, Compulsory Licensing and National Defense: Danger in Abandoning
Our Patent System, 35 A.B.A.J. 476 (1949), where it was argued that the secrecy pro-
visions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 would discourage new inventions in the field.
It seems probable that Congress, in enacting the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, intended
to compensate for the discouraging effect of a secrecy order by giving the inventor the
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effect on national security than any blanket prohibition of in camera trials
could have had.
Release-Effect of Release of Original Tort-Feasor on Claim Against Phy-
sician Who Aggravated Injury.-Plaintiff, seriously injured in an automobile
accident in Ohio, was transferred for treatment to a New Jersey hospital, where
he was placed under the care of defendants. He then instituted an action in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against
the original Ohio tort-feasor, seeking recovery for all injuries resulting
from the accident. That action terminated in a mistrial. Pending retrial,
plaintiff instituted the present action, charging defendant doctors with negli-
gence in treatment which aggravated his pre-existing injuries.' Plaintiff then
concluded a settlement of his case against the Ohio tort-feasors, and delivered
to defendants therein a formal release. This release was executed in New
Jersey.
Defendant doctors asserted the release as a defense in plaintiff's action,
contending that the effect of the release was governed by Ohio law. In Ohio
the release would bar the malpractice action. The law division,2 upholding
defendant's contention, gave summary judgment against the plaintiff and plain-
tiff appealed.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed and remanded. The court
held that the release, executed in New Jersey, of the Ohio tort claim against
the original tort-feasor is governed by Ohio law insofar as the Ohio tort claim
is concerned, but its effect on the New Jersey tort claim against defendant
doctors is governed by the law of New Jersey. Moreover, under New Jersey law,
a physician who aggravates a pre-existing injury is an independent tort-feasor,
and a general release given to the original tort-feasor will not release the
negligent physician from liability, except to the extent that the original settle-
ment was full compensation for the malpractice claim, or intended as such.
Daily v. Somberg, 28 N.J. 372, 146 A.2d 676 (1958).
A release is the surrender of a cause of action, which may be gratuitous
or given for a consideration.3 Its validity is generally governed by the law of
greater assurance of adequate reward for his efforts by means of the right of judicial
review.
1. The second count in the complaint alleged that defendant doctors had failed to
live up to their obligations under contract, and thereby aggravated plaintiff's injuries.
In Von Blumenthal v. Cassola, 166 Misc. 744, 3 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 254 App.
Div. 857, 6 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1938), the court found that a release, which barred an action
in negligence against a technical joint tort-feasor who allegedly aggravated the original
injury, did not release him from the contract claim alleged as a separate cause of action.
The court in the instant case did not get to this question, having found liability on the
first count.
2. 49 N.J. Super. 469, 140 A.2d 429 (L. 1958).
3. For an excellent discussion of the distinction between release and satisfaction, and the
unfortunate judicial confusion of the two, see 1 Harper & James, Torts § 10.1 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Harper & James].
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the place where executed, 4 but its effectiveness in barring a cause of action is
determined by the law of the place of injury.5 At common law, when given to
one of two joint tort-feasors6 who had acted in concert, it necessarily released
the other; the reasoning followed was that there was but one cause of action
against the two. 7 On the other hand, independent wrongdoers who were liable
for the same loss were not absolved from liability by a release of one of them,
except so far as the release constituted actual satisfaction of the claim.8  In
time, however, some jurisdictions extended the rule governing joint tort-
feasors to independent tort-feasors.9 Therefore, a general release of the one
responsible for the original injury precluded an action by the injured party
against a physician for damages incurred from negligent treatment of the
injury.10 These courts regarded the aggravation of the injury as part of
the original injury for which the original tort-feasor was liable."
4. 76 C.J.S. Release § 39 (1952).
5. Ibid. In Preine v. Freeman, 112 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Va. 1953), an action by residents
of New York against residents of Virginia for injuries and damages suffered in a collision
of vehicles in Virginia, the court determined that "since the cause of action arose in Vir-
ginia, and the suits were instituted in Virginia, the laws of that state which give the plain-
tiff the cause of action also control in determining the effect of the releases." Id. at 260.
In that case one of the instruments had been executed in New York, the other in Colorado.
See Butler v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 140 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.N.C. 1956); Western Newspaper
Union v. Woodward, 133 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Mo. 1955); Shapiro v. Embassy Dairy, 112
F. Supp. 696 (E.D.N.C. 1953) ; Goldstein v. Gilbert, 125 W. Va. 250, 23 S.E.2d 606 (1942).
6. While the concept of "joint torts" has been employed under varying circumstances, it
should strictly be used "where the behavior of two or more tort-feasors is such as to make
it proper to treat the conduct of each as the conduct of the others as well." 1 Harper &
James § 10.1, at 692. See Salmond, Torts § 27 (12th ed. 1957). This, in effect, requires
the existence of a concert of action, or breach of a joint duty and the wrongdoers will be
held jointly and severally, or entirely, liable for the harm proximately resulting. For the
development of independent concurring torts, not within the above definition, as joint
torts in practical effect. See note 9 infra.
7. The release barred any suit against any of the other joint wrongdoers for the same
wrong, since the injured party was entitled to one satisfaction from whatever source.
Prosser, Torts § 46 (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as Prosser].
8. Ibid.
9. 76 C.J.S. Release § 50 (1952). Thus, the idea of joint and several liability was ex-
tended to situations where there was neither concert of action nor breach of common duty,
but where a single indivisible harm had been sustained as a result of the independent, sepa-
rate but tortious acts of two or more persons. 1 Harper & James § 10.1. As for the de-
velopment of judicial failure to maintain the difference between joint tort-feasors, who
were jointly and severally liable, and concurrent tort-feasors, who were originally only
severally liable, see Note, 18 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 378 (1949). Prosser severely criticizes the
American judicial confusion of release and satisfaction that followed upon the diminished
effect given to the seal, and especially takes issue with the designation of concurrent wrong-
doers as joint tort-feasors. Prosser § 46.
10. This position has been adopted by the following jurisdictions: Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1075 (1955).
11. 41 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons § 137 (1942). It would be an undue compli-
This view prevails in Ohio. In Tanner v. Espey'2 the court reasoned that
since full recovery could have been obtained against the original wrongdoer,
and it was not, the partial settlement constituted full compensation for all
damages arising out of the accident. 13 A distinction was engrafted on this
rule in Mainfort v. Giannestras.'4 There the court declared that "the sole
question is whether the negligence of the defendant surgeon aggravated the
original injury or created an independent injury, unassociated with the orig-
inal wrong and not reasonably foreseeable by the original wrongdoer as a
natural sequence of his wrong."'15
A different approach is taken in the California case of Ask v. Mortensen,'6
where the court stated that it would be unreasonable and unjust to discharge
defendants on account of the release given the original wrongdoer. Pointing out
that the independent acts of the wrongdoers gave rise to two distinct causes
of action, the court said: "In their [defendants'] view, the amount of damages
sustained by plaintiff, the sum received as consideration for the release, and
the relation between the two, the intention of the parties, and the fact that...
[the tort-feasors] are independent rather than joint wrongdoers, are imma-
terial."'1 7 The court reasoned that the rule releasing both tort-feasors if one
is released was arrived at by treating the independent wrongdoers as joint
tort-feasors, or by applying, analogously, the common law rule of unity of
discharge affecting joint tort-feasors. The court concluded that "a release
of a cause of action against a wrongdoer is . ..a release of a separate or
distinct cause of action against another independent wrongdoer . . . [only]
'if there has been full compensation for both injuries, but not otherwise.' "18
ment to the medical profession to say that bad surgery or treatment is not part of the
foreseeable risk of the original injury. Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 AUt. 107 (1937).
Some courts have reasoned that since the one causing the original injury is liable for the
consequences of physician's negligence, which would not have occurred but for the original
negligence, the release of the original tort-feasor is a release of the physician as well.
Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1075 (1955).
12. 128 Ohio St. 82, 190 N.E. 229 (1934).
13. Knight v. Strong, 101 Ohio App. 347, 140 N.E.2d 9 (1955), accepted and followed
the reasoning of the Tanner case.
14. 49 Ohio Op. 440, 111 N.E.2d 692 (C.P. 1951).
15. Id. at 442, 111 N.E.2d at 694. There is no unanimity on the part of the courts
respecting what constitutes a new injury. Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1075, 1083 (1955). See
41 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons § 137 (1942), which points out that here settlement
with the injured party discharges only that claim for which the wrongdoer is liable.
When confronted with the present situation the lower New Jersey court, reasoning that
Ohio law controlled, held that the release of the original tort-feasor automatically released
defendant doctors, unless plaintiff could establish that defendants' alleged negligent conduct
produced a new and independent injury, rather than an aggravation of the injuries sus-
tained in the accident. 49 N.J. Super. 469, 476, 140 A.2d 429, 433 (L. 1958).
16. 24 Cal. 2d 654, 150 P.2d 876 (1944). Here plaintiff successfully sued defendant
doctors after having given a release for an amount less than the judgment to the original
tort-feasors.
17. Id. at 656, 150 P.2d at 878.
18. 24 Cal. 2d at 656, 150 P.2d at 878. This decision was subsequently extended by the
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Prior to the case under consideration, New Jersey had only one lower court
opinion, Adams v. De Yoe, 19 which adopted the majority view. The court
there treated defendants as joint tort-feasors, so that a release of one consti-
tuted a release of the other. Substantial doubt, however, was cast upon this
decision by Breen v. Peck,20 which rejected the strict common law release
rule for joint tort-feasors. The Breen court reasoned that a general release will
not discharge other joint tort-feasors, unless it is so intended, or unless the
consideration for it constitutes full compensation, or is accepted as such. The
court, in the present case, first determined that the law of the locus delicti
governed the effect of the release. 21 But, it reasoned, Ohio was the locus only
of the original injury, while New Jersey was the locus of the intervening tort
committed by the defendant doctors. Thus, it concluded that New Jersey
law determined the effect of the release with respect to the present action.22
Applying the law of New Jersey, therefore, to the severable New Jersey wrong,
the court concluded that there was no reason for disabling the plaintiff from
maintaining his malpractice claim in that state unless he had released it
in accordance with that law. The release of the original tort-feasor could
not automatically release the subsequent tort-feasor without payment or con-
tribution on his part. The court recognized that if the release of the original
wrongdoer was intended to release the doctors, or if the amount paid actually
constituted full compensation for plaintiff's claim, or was accepted as such,
plaintiff could not fairly or equitably seek further recovery. Since the ques-
tions of intent and full compensation are factual in nature, and could not be
determined by the trial court on defendants' motion for summary judgment,
the case was remanded for trial.
The fact that the original tort-feasor is wholly liable for all the damages
resulting from his negligence, including those incurred by virtue of negligent
courts to the situation where the plaintiff had settled with the original tort-feasor and
released him without entry of judgment. See, e.g., Dickow v. Cookinham, 123 Cal. App. 2d
81, 266 P.2d 63 (1954); Gerald v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 121 Cal. App. 2d
761, 264 P.2d 90 (1953). Cf. Alexander v. Hammarberg, 103 Cal. App. 2d 872, 230 P.2d
399 (1951).
19. 11 N.J. Misc. 319, 166 AtI. 485 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
20. 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958).
21. For inherent difficulties in application of such a rule, see Shuman & Prevezer, Torts
in English and American Conflict of Laws: The Role of the Forum, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 1067,
1072-73 (1958).
22. The court was fully aware that if the tortious conduct in a foreign state were fol-
lowed by injurious consequences in the state of the forum the choice of law would be
troublesome, for the state of the forum would be vitally interested and would have ade-
quate cause for applying its own law. Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law,
52 Colum. L. Rev. 959, 976 (1952). See also, Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 93 (3d ed.
1949). Determining the situation to be one where the tortious conduct in the foreign state
was followed in the state of the forum, not only by injurious consequences, but also by
independent tortious conduct of other tort-feasors, the court felt that New Jersey, as the
state of the forum rather than the foreign state, was the one with the dominant interest
and the stronger policy reasons for applying its own just legal principles. See Rheinstein,
The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 Tul. L. Rev. 4 (1944).
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medical treatment of the original injuries, does not, of course, contradict the
existence of two 'causes of action 3 The injured person may pursue either,24
but is limited to one satisfaction 2 5 That the person wronged may receive
but one satisfaction should be of primary concern, but assurance of this should
not lie necessarily in the application of a stereotyped formula. Granted that
the rule followed by the majority of jurisdictions has a practical utility,
nonetheless, it would appear that New Jersey, in looking to the extent of the
settlement, and in considering the intention of the parties negotiating the
release, has adopted a more desirable criterion.
Under such a rule which credits the amount paid by the first tort-feasor
for the medical injury pro tanto to the second tort-feasor, any fear of double
recovery is dispelled.26 Any other criterion would tend to discourage com-
promises which the law favors, and give physicians an advantage wholly incon-
sistent with the nature of their liability.
23. Restatement, Torts § 879, illustration 3 (1939). But see Milks v. McIver, 264
N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1934), where the court said: "It may be argued that the original
wrongdoer who caused the injury and the physician whose negligence aggravated the injury
are not, in technical sense, joint tort-feasors. Nevertheless their wrongs coalesced and re-
sulted in damage which would not have been sustained but for the original injury." Id. at
269, 190 N.E. at 488-89.
24. Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 211, 192 Atl. 107, 109 (1937).
25. It is submitted that dissatisfied plaintiffs will not be able to turn from the primary
wrongdoer to their treating physician, and that treating physicians will not be forced to be
noncommunicative for fear that their reports and opinions may later be used against them
in a malpractice suit. Nor need they be overeager to see that their plaintiff obtain a large
settlement so that the issue of complete satisfaction in the event of a later, malpractice
claim will be dear.
26. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 Calif. L. Rev. 413, 425 (1937).
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